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I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment prohibition on viewpoint discrimination, a par-
ticularly invidious species of content discrimination, represents a consistent
theme in the Court's free speech clause jurisprudence. Although the Court
has never precisely defined the concept of viewpoint discrimination, the idea
that the government may not censor certain views and thereby skew public
debate - even in a nonpublic forum - is a well-established one.1
In the elementary and secondary public school context, the Court has
not explicitly applied the doctrinal framework of viewpoint discrimination to
a school practice or policy restricting speech. However, in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,2 the Court's initial applica-
tion of the First Amendment to student speech in public secondary schools,
the Court stated that schools may not fashion students into "closed-circuit
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate."3 In ex-
plaining its holding, the Court stressed the fact that the schools apparently
sought to prohibit only the wearing of armbands symbolizing opposition to
the Vietnam War, and not other politically controversial symbols.4 In sev-
eral places in the opinion, the Court came very close to saying that schools
may not engage in viewpoint discrimination: "Clearly, the prohibition of ex-
pression of one 'particular opinion, at least without evidence that it is neces-
sary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or disci-
pline, is not constitutionally permissible. 5 In a controlled environment such
as a public elementary or secondary school, unlike a street corner or park,
school officials may have legitimate reasons for limiting the expression of
particular points of view, such as the need to maintain order and protect stu-
dents from potentially harmful messages. 6 Hence the standard in Tinker, re-
quiring a showing of material and substantial interference with the operation
of the school or with the rights of other students, is lower than the Court's
near absolute prohibition on viewpoint discrimination in other settings.7
1. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393 (1993);
see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37 (1983).
2. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
3. Id. at 511.
4. ld.at510.
5. Id. at 511. The Court also stated:
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular
expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by something
more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accom-
pany an unpopular viewpoint.
Id. at 509. See also Perry, 460 U.S. at 61 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that Tinker can be
understood as implicitly prohibiting viewpoint discrimination, regardless of whether the speech oc-
curs in a nonpublic forum).
6. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
7. Seeid. at511-13.
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Interestingly, the Court in Tinker seemed to assume that a school's re-
striction on speech arising from a classroom discussion or interaction would
necessarily implicate the marketplace of ideas. The armband protest, on the
other hand, while "closely akin to 'pure speech,"' did not fit neatly into the
paradigm the Court often uses to justify free speech.8 Quoting from an ear-
lier case, Justice Fortas noted:
The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas." The Na-
tion's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to
that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth "out of a multi-
tude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative se-
lection." 9
In applying free speech principles to the armband protest, the Court
reasoned that the free speech principle it articulated was "not con-
fined to the supervised and ordained discussion which takes place in
the classroom."' 0
Yet the special characteristics of the school environment lead many to
argue, persuasively, that a requirement of viewpoint neutrality has little
place in the public school setting." The marketplace paradigm may be par-
ticularly inappropriate in the classroom setting, given that teachers often
limit expression of views to the germane, and routinely judge as correct or
incorrect student assertions and responses with reference to a concept of ob-
jective truth determined by the teacher, text, or local school board, as the
case may be.' 2 In any case, the strength of the marketplace model must de-
pend on several factors including the grade level, age, and maturity of the
students involved, 3 as evidenced by Keyishian, the case quoted in Tinker,
8. Id. at 505-06.
9. Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967), which held as
unconstitutionally vague a state plan which operated to prevent the appointment or retention of pub-
lic school employees that advocated or taught the forcible overthrow of government).
10. Id. Moreover, the Court stated that it did not "confine the permissible exercise of First
Amendment rights to a telephone booth or the four corners of a pamphlet, or to supervised and or-
dained discussion in a school classroom." Id. at 513.
11. The public school has at times been characterized as a limited public forum, and at other
times, as a nonpublic forum. See generally Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37 (1983); Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530 (7th Cir. 1996).
12. See, e.g., David A. Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools. The Case Against
Judicial Intervention, 59 TEx. L. REV. 477, 497 (1980).
Throughout the school year, the teacher, after attempting to convey to the students the re-
quired version of a particular subject, tests them to see if they have learned the material
properly. Answers conforming to the view taught in the class get high marks, while in-
consistent views may get low marks.... Thus, from one point of view, the public schools
embody in all their aspects the denial of [F]irst [A]mendment rights.
Id.
13. Certainly with respect to elementary school education, it would seem utterly self-defeating to
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which involved a government attempt to prevent alleged subversives from
teaching in state colleges and universities.1 4  In fact, the Supreme Court's
decision in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,1 5 a later case, signifi-
cantly disappointed the expectations of those who read Tinker as providing
robust free speech rights for students. In Hazelwood, the Court upheld a
high school principal's decision to withhold from publication portions of
student articles in the school newspaper precisely because of the material
discussed in the articles.' 6  With no mention (except in Justice Brennan's
dissent) of the "marketplace of ideas," the Court held that the newspaper,
published as part of a high school journalism class, was a school-sponsored
expressive activity over which the school exercised editorial control.'
7
Hazelwood produced a strikingly different standard than the one in Tinker,
the former promising to uphold school actions that are "reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns." 8
If the only theoretical underpinning of a viewpoint discrimination ban in
the context of the public schools is the "marketplace of ideas," then the ar-
guments against heightened free speech protection carry some weight. Of
course teachers determine content, make value judgments, and limit the ex-
pression of views available for acceptance. This implicit qualifier harmo-
nizes the language of Tinker with the result in Hazelwood, where the Court
reasoned that a school acting as a publisher or producer could refuse to dis-
seminate student speech on topics such as "the existence of Santa Claus in
an elementary school setting" and "the particulars of teenage sexual activity
in a high school setting" to protect students. 9 At best, the public school in
general and the classroom in particular is a type of modified marketplace
where students may exchange some ideas20 but school officials ultimately
maintain an egalitarian environment where all present - students included - possess the requisite
knowledge to determine the truth.
14. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 591-92.
15. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
16. Id. at 263.
17. Id. at 273.
18. Id. The Hazelwood opinion omits any mention of viewpoint discrimination, and lower courts
have divided over whether, in cases that otherwise fall within Hazelwood's parameters, courts must
engage in a viewpoint discrimination analysis. Compare Walz ex rel. Walz v, Egg Harbor Township
Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting no viewpoint discrimination concerns present
when school has not created an open forum for the exchange of views, and upholding restriction on
elementary school student from distributing pencils with religious messages), and Fleming v. Jeffer-
son County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002) (applying Hazelwood and not viewpoint neu-
trality analysis, and upholding school restriction on displaying tiles with religious and other mes-
sages created by students and parents following Columbine massacre), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1110
(2003), and C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 1999) (indicating no viewpoint neutral-
ity standard applicable in Hazelwood analysis, and upholding teacher's decision to forbid student
from reading Biblical story in front of the class), affd on other grounds en banc, 226 F.3d 198 (3d
Cir. 2000), with Kincaid v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 719, 727 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating in dicta that only non-
viewpoint-based restrictions are permitted under Hazelwood, and upholding restriction on material in
state university yearbook), rev'd on other grounds en banc, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001).
19. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272.
20. Ideas that are deemed vulgar or profane, for example, may be completely restricted by the
state. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (holding that a high school
student's sexually suggestive remarks at a high school assembly did not merit First Amendment pro-
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determine truth. Notwithstanding all of the Tinker Court's rhetoric about the
classroom and the marketplace, however, this particular justification does
not seem to have been the central focus of concern for the Court. Rather, the
Court's language in Tinker leaves the reader to understand that there is a line
between inculcation and indoctrination - and that the Court can, if called
upon, readily distinguish between the two.
2
'
This article investigates the latter aspect of the Court's jurisprudence -
the concept of improper indoctrination. The subject of public schools and
indoctrination has generated much scholarly debate in recent years, and I do
not intend to join that specific debate here. Rather, this article makes a fairly
narrow doctrinal point about how to interpret and apply the Court's free
speech doctrine in light of concerns about possible indoctrination. The arti-
cle reviews key free speech clause precedent to determine whether the Court
imposes a type of viewpoint neutrality requirement for school policies that
exhibit bias against religious opinions, political opinions, or opinions on
matters related to race. The article argues that concerns about indoctrination
expressed as a "no-bias" principle can be used to understand what the Court
has already done with respect to free speech in public schools. These con-
cepts can also be used to decide the proper outcome of future First Amend-
ment cases.
Part II of the article identifies the type of bias to which the Court's ju-
risprudence is opposed, highlighting religion, political preference, and race
as the most likely targets. Because such matters go to the heart of a child or
adolescent's developing identity, Part II argues that the Court's jurispru-
dence is particularly concerned about shielding these areas from too much
state interference. Part III argues that particularly in the case of religion,
free speech safeguards permit students to "push back" against official efforts
to enforce orthodoxy and can be helpful for students' developing identities.
Part III also answers arguments that religious speech in public discourse is
unhealthy and that religious speech threatens to undermine Establishment
Clause values. Part IV applies the no-bias standard to a sampling of school
speech cases.
II. DOCTRINAL BASIS FOR VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOL CONTEXT
A. Values Inculcation and the Danger of Indoctrination
The Supreme Court has often stated that the public schools engage in
tection).
21. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1969).
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the "'preparation of individuals for participation as citizens,"' and assume
the task of "'inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of
a democratic political system.' 22 The Court emphasized this idea in Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser,23 a case in which school officials disci-
plined a high school student who delivered a sexually provocative student
election speech at an assembly.24 In Bethel, the Court explained that one of
the "fundamental values" that schools should inculcate is the maxim that
threatening or offensive public discourse is inappropriate.25 In upholding the
restriction on Fraser's speech, the Court reasoned that school officials create
an atmosphere in which students learn values:
The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools
is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class;
schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized so-
cial order. Consciously or otherwise, teachers - and indeed the
older students - demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse
and political expression by their conduct and deportment in and out
of class. Inescapably, like parents, they are role models.26
The idea that schools should inculcate values is not without controversy.
The inculcation of values from official and unofficial sources, no doubt, is
what lead some to avoid public school altogether.27 Government attempts at
assimilation have been equated with indoctrination in some quarters, at least
by those who complain that attempted assimilation of students into concepts
such as critical rationality and tolerance may conflict with belief systems de-
veloped by parents.28 Others have echoed general fears that government at-
tempts to inculcate values in impressionable young minds risks forfeiting
democracy for a sort of totalitarian mind control.29
This article uses the term "indoctrination" as something more than the
mere attempted assimilation into civic republican values that the Supreme
Court has repeatedly suggested is appropriate work for the public schools.
Even for those, such as the Court, who approve of the idea of government-
22. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982)
(quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
23. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
24. Id. at 677-78.
25. See id. at 683.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (granting Amish community Free Exer-
cise exemption from requirement of compulsory education beyond the eighth grade to protect Amish
community against secular influences).
28. See, e.g., Nomi Maya Stoltzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out": Assimilation,
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581 (1993) (evaluating
the claim of the plaintiffs in Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987),
who objected to students' exposure to an allegedly secular humanist reading series).
29. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn in School Today? Free
Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 62, 66-
68 (2002) (advocating an anti-indoctrination model of the First Amendment to combat school at-
tempts to inculcate values outside the context of the curriculum).
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disseminated values, a separate danger exists of official interference with
sectarian opinions that probably ought to be developed elsewhere. 30 The
point at which courts should draw the line between inculcation and indoctri-
nation can be difficult to discern, but a focus on the subject matter of the
student's proposed expression can aid the process. 31 When school officials
attempt to suppress the expression of an idea opposed to the government's
position, particularly in the areas of race, religion and politics, a type of bias
is revealed. Vigorous free speech protection will remedy these instances of
attempted indoctrination.
In the alternative, some have advanced the desirability of claiming a
First Amendment violation based upon the school's attempt to shape opin-
ions, rather than on the school's attempt to suppress student speech.32 They
argue that indoctrination attempts affect more than just the student bringing
a lawsuit; therefore, an individual rights approach misses the mark.33 None-
theless, values inculcation does not always result in indoctrination; what to
one student may constitute religious and political indoctrination may to an-
other student be only useful information that is readily discarded. At a
minimum, when a student resists a certain orthodoxy and school officials
subsequently attempt to suppress the student's dissent, that student is clearly
identified as a possible target of indoctrination.
In the following cases, the Court has sketched the outlines of what could
be described as a model of First Amendment jurisprudence based on the
evils of improper indoctrination, from which we can distill a no-bias princi-
ple.
30. To indoctrinate is to "imbue with a usually partisan or sectarian opinion, point of view, or
principle." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, at http://www.m-w.com (last visited September 28,
2004).
31. This line-drawing can be difficult in part because, in the context of public school students'
individual rights, the Supreme Court's dicta conceives of students not as fully autonomous individu-
als but as persons over whom the state exercises a quasi-parental role. See, e.g., Vemonia Sch. Dist.
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995) (finding constitutional a high school's random drug test-
ing of students involved in extracurricular activities without a showing of individual suspicion). As
the Court stated in Vernonia:
[T]he nature of [the State's power over schoolchildren] is custodial and tutelary, permit-
ting a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults. "[A]
proper educational environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as
the enforcement of rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if under-
taken by an adult."... [W]e have acknowledged that for many purposes "school au-
thorities act in loco parentis," with the power and indeed the duty to "inculcate the habits
and manners of civility[.]" Thus, while children assuredly do not "shed their constitu-
tional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate," the nature of those rights is what is appropriate
for children in school.
Id. at 655-56 (citations omitted).
32. See Redish & Finnerty, supra note 29, at 83 ("When government crosses the constitutional
line in the scope of its curricular and non-curricular education, no single individual student is harmed
more than any other.").
33. See id.
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B. First Amendment Prohibition Against Indoctrination and Bias
The Supreme Court's trilogy of Tinker, Bethel and Hazelwood leaves
the reader with mixed signals about students' free speech rights in the ele-
mentary and secondary school setting.34 Clearly, students do not enjoy the
same rights of expression as adults in other settings. Nonetheless, the
Court's language and decision in Tinker suggests that school attempts to si-
lence certain messages can approximate indoctrination. 35  Hazelwood pro-
vides schools with wide latitude to limit expression within the curriculum,
but is virtually silent on whether schools can attempt to indoctrinate. Two
cases, one preceding Tinker and one preceding Hazelwood, help to construct
the distinction between inculcation and indoctrination in the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence.
1. "[Plolitics, [N]ationalism, [R]eligion, or [O]ther [M]atters of
[O]pinion"3 6
A look back at an earlier case, West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette,37 may help clarify the core viewpoint discrimination problem
perceived by the Court in Tinker. In Barnette, the Supreme Court held that
public school officials may not require unwilling students to recite the
Pledge of Allegiance.38 Justice Jackson concluded the opinion in one of the
Court's most memorable pronouncements: "If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.
39
To elucidate this famous passage, one commentator has suggested that
the writer of the Court's opinion should have used an "and" in place of the
disjunctive "or": The "and" would have made clear that that the harm in
Barnette was not simply that the government was prescribing orthodoxy, but
that it was both prescribing and forcing citizens to genuflect.40 In the case of
public schools, this interpretation has some force. Schools, in particular, of-
ten dictate "right opinions," so it is difficult to discern precisely what the
Court meant except that it was wrong for the schools to attempt to coerce
students' behavior in an area that went to identity and not simply preference
34. One scholar surveyed Supreme Court precedent and lower court decisions since Tinker and
opined that the majority's position in Tinker has been sharply eroded. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Stu-
dents Do Leave Their First Amendment Constitutional Rights at the Schoolhouse Gates: What's Left
of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527 (2000).
35. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09.
36. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
37. Id. (overruling Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)).
38. Id. The Court also opined that the First Amendment freedom from compelled orthodoxy
does not depend on the religious nature of the objection, though the students in Barnette, Jehovah's
Witnesses, objected to the flag salute on religious grounds. See id. at 634-35.
39. Id. at 642.
40. See Stephen D. Smith, Barnette's Big Blunder, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 631-32 (2003)
(arguing that government often prescribes "right opinions," but the First Amendment should only be
concerned with government attempts to coerce conformity to them).
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or whim. One could argue that the real proscription in Barnette is not based
on the lofty constellation of abstract principles, but one based on practical
concerns. Put in today's language, we could add an explanatory line in
Barnette stating that children of Republicans should not come home from
school as Democrats, that Muslim children should not come home as Chris-
tians,41 or based on the facts of Barnette, that children who are Jehovah's
Witnesses should not come home as mainstream Protestants who show their
patriotism in a "normal" or acceptable way.42 The Tinker Court arguably
picked up on this concern when it stated that students should not be made
into "closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to com-
municate. 43
It is significant that the protest element linking Tinker to the concerns
about compelled orthodoxy in Barnette is student speech. The closed-circuit
metaphor seems somewhat inappropriate in the context of schools, where
school authorities (as opposed to students) control all aspects of instruction.
Students share ideas with each other, but they generally do not have a consti-
tutional right to veto curriculum or bring in outside materials to compete on
an equal footing with the instruction presented by the school. Rather, the
dicta from Tinker makes sense in the context of that case, when we consider
the possibility that students will try to assert their developing religious or po-
litical identity by a variety of methods, many of which we call speech.
When schools silence such self-assertion without good reason, it creates
what the Court described as "closed-circuit" communication. Thus Tinker,
like Barnette, can arguably be viewed as protecting a student's right to push
back against authority for the limited but eminent purpose of maintaining or
developing identity free from state interference.
41. Cf, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). In Edwards, the Court invalidated a
Louisiana law that required "balanced treatment" of creation and evolution in public schools, hold-
ing that the law was a violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 582. In reaching the decision,
the Court noted, "[f]amilies entrust public schools with the education of their children, but condition
their trust on the understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious
views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her family." Id. at 584.
42. As a proposed compromise with school officials, the Jehovah's Witnesses in Barnette had
offered to say the following version of the Pledge of Allegiance that did not specifically venerate the
flag, apparently because they believed it to be less offensive to their religious teachings: "I pledge
allegiance and obedience to all the laws of the United States that are consistent with God's law, as
set forth in the Bible." Barnette, 319 U.S. at 628 n.4.
43. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). Even more clearly
in the case of the school children in Barnette, the school's suppression of dissent shielded them from
any messages other than the official one.
2. Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26
v. Pico
44
In Board of Education of Island Trees v. Pico, the Supreme Court con-
sidered whether a local school board's decision to remove certain books
deemed "vulgar" and "anti-American" from public junior high and high
school libraries constituted a violation of students' First Amendment
rights.45 In a plurality opinion, Justice Brennan explained that the First
Amendment would preclude a school board from removing books with the
intent to deny access to ideas with which the board disagreed.46 Thus a
school board may not suppress unpopular ideas and thereby "'prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opin-
ion."
47
Justice Blackmun defended the plurality's decision in his concurrence,
but disagreed on the issue of whether the First Amendment creates in stu-
dents a "right to receive information.,,48 Rather, Blackmun perceived the
tension in the case to be between the school's broad power to inculcate stu-
dents with ideas and the constitutional prohibition on "certain forms of state
discrimination between ideas., 49 Blackmun proposed to resolve the tension
by articulating a rule that the government may not remove books from a
school library for the purpose of suppressing ideas because of a distaste for
the ideas themselves.5
In his dissent in Pico, Justice Rehnquist highlighted the inherent selec-
tivity in elementary and secondary education as the critical difference be-
tween the government as educator and the government as sovereign:
When [the government] acts as an educator, at least at the elemen-
tary and secondary school level, [it] is engaged in inculcating social
values and knowledge in relatively impressionable young people.
Obviously there are innumerable decisions to be made as to what
courses should be taught, what books should be purchased, or what
teachers should be employed.... In the very course of administer-
ing the many-faceted operations of a school district, the mere deci-
sion to purchase some books will necessarily preclude the possibil-
ity of purchasing others. The decision to teach a particular subject
44. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
45. See id. at 857, 859. For example, the school board had removed nine books from the high
school library: SLAUGHTER HOUSE FIVE, by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.; THE NAKED APE, by Desmond
Morris; DOWN THESE MEAN STREETS, by Piri Thomas; BEST SHORT STORIES By NEGRO WRITERS,
edited by Langston Hughes; Go ASK ALICE (anonymous); LAUGHING Boy, by Oliver LaFarge;
BLACK Boy, by Richard Wright; A HERO AIN'T NOTHIN' BUT A SANDWICH, by Alice Childress; and
SOUL ON ICE, by Eldridge Cleaver. Id. at 856 n.3.
46. See id. at 871. The Court opined that the board could have removed the books on the ground
that they deemed the books "pervasively vulgar," or based solely upon the ground of "educational
suitability." Id.
47. Id. at 872 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642).
48. Id. at 876-79 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 878-79 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
50. See id. at 879-82 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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may preclude the possibility of teaching another subject. A decision
to replace a teacher because of ineffectiveness may by implication
be seen as a disparagement of the subject matter taught. In each of
these instances, however, the book or the exposure to the subject
matter may be acquired elsewhere. The managers of the school dis-
trict are not proscribing it as to the citizenry in general, but are sim-
ply determining that it will not be included in the curriculum or
school library. 1
Rehnquist conceded that a politically motivated Democratic school board
could not remove all books written by or in favor of Republicans, and that a
racially motivated all-white school board could not remove all books au-
thored by blacks or in favor of racial equality, 52 but believed that rarely
would such "extreme examples" occur in real life.53 Thus, notwithstanding
the distinction between a school's suppression of students' individual ex-
pression and a school district's decision to remove books from a school li-
brary,54 the plurality and dissent apparently agreed on the impropriety of
schools attempting, through suppression, to shape racial or political opin-
ions. They disagreed on whether such suppression had been or could be
demonstrated on the facts in Pico.
Together, Tinker, Barnette, and Pico suggest three areas in which the
Court is concerned about attempts to control student thought and expression:
politics, religion, and race. Applying this principle, Part IV of this article
uses a no-bias approach to a sampling of First Amendment cases in these ar-
eas. In Part HI, however, it is necessary to first answer particular concerns
about religious speech in the context of the public schools.
III. SPECIAL CONCERNS ABOUT RELIGIOUS SPEECH
A. Establishment Clause Issues Raised by Student Speech
Free speech claims involving religious speech are more complicated
than other speech claims because of the potential intersection with the First
Amendment's prohibition against a government establishment of religion.
To determine whether a particular policy or practice violates the Establish-
ment Clause, the Supreme Court has asked whether a particular practice sat-
51. Id. at 909-10 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 907 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
53. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 886 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (highlighting the difference between a student's individ-
ual expression and a school district's choice of whether to make books available in the school li-
brary).
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isfies the three prongs of Lemon v. Kurtzman,55 whether a practice consti-
tutes an endorsement of religion,56 or whether the practice coerces others
into participation. 7 In most cases involving religious speech, the critical is-
sue is whether the speech constitutes the private speech of the individual
student or the official speech of the school.5 8
1. Speech That Occurs as Part of a Classroom Assignment
In cases involving classroom speech, whether the student's speech is
sponsored by the school cannot be assumed, but must be determined by ana-
lyzing the facts. 59 In the case of a classroom assignment containing religious
material, it would seem that the issue is whether the activity in question co-
erces students into participation, or whether a reasonable (student) observer
would deem the assignment to be an endorsement of religion.60 A written
assignment such as a research paper or essay containing religious themes
would seem to pose the smallest risk of establishment. There would be no
possibility of coercion, and presumably no one but the student author and the
teacher would read the content of the paper. Neither would the student writ-
ing the paper believe that the school, acting through the teacher who merely
accepted the assignment, intended to endorse religion. Though other stu-
dents may hear about the topic from the student author, it still seems
unlikely that those students will attribute the author's message to the school.
The oral assignment presents a more difficult case. Examples include
an elementary school student who selected a story based on the Bible to read
in front of the class,61 and a second grade student who desired to present dur-
ing show and tell a video of herself singing an evangelical song in a church
service.62 In these situations, it is possible for young students to assume that
the teacher at least approves of the student's message, even if the school has
no independent agenda to promote religion. To avoid violations of the Es-
tablishment Clause, a teacher should make clear that students speak for
themselves on topics of their own choosing, and that the teacher has no in-
55. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). As noted by the Court in Lemon, "First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor in-
hibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with relig-
ion."' Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
56. Lisa Shaw Roy, The Establishment Clause and the Concept of Inclusion, 83 OR. L. REV. 1,
16-17 (2004).
57. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (citations omitted).
58. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of the Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
59. Compare Kathleen A. Brady, The Push to Private Religious Expression: Are We Missing
Something?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1147 (2002) (characterizing classroom speech as "grey area
speech" that is part public and part private), with Duran v. Nitsche, 780 F. Supp. 1048, 1054 n.8
(E.D. Pa. 1991) (classifying student's proposed classroom speech in an oral report as the "school
itself' rather than school sponsored speech).
60. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 772-83 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
61. C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167, 169 (3d Cir. 1999).
62. See DeNooyer v. Livonia Public Schs., 799 F. Supp. 744, 746 (E.D. Mich. 1992), affd in an
unpublished opinion, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 20606.
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terest in either promoting or suppressing religious messages. In some cases,
however, the religious message may be so pervasive that it will be impossi-
ble for a school to separate itself from the message. For example, a teacher
could not permit a student to lead the class in an act of worship or to use
class time to attempt to convert other students to his or her faith.63
In cases involving classroom assignments, courts typically have avoided
the Establishment Clause question, instead applying free speech doctrine and
Hazelwood.64 Nevertheless, a Hazelwood analysis can address many Estab-
lishment Clause concerns.65 When a student's attempt to fulfill an assign-
ment subverts the activity or skill that the assignment was designed to teach,
it is more likely that other students will interpret the presentation as going
beyond the bounds of pedagogy and into the domain of religious endorse-
ment.66 So, for example, in the case of a student's story based on a Biblical
theme, if the purpose of the assignment is to showcase good readers and the
parameters of the assignment permit any text, then the student's choice
should be permissible. 67 A lengthy reading directly from the Bible or the
Koran, on the other hand, would probably be viewed as devotional and out
of place. In the case of the student's video, the parameters of the assignment
would also be critical. If, for example, the assignment did not permit stu-
dents to engage in acts constituting entertainment, the student's video would
seem odd and out of place, again giving the impression that perhaps the
school specifically approved the message and thus decided to include a pres-
entation that was otherwise inappropriate.68
The problem with this use of the Hazelwood analysis, however, is that
often school officials do not provide clear guidelines at the outset, and it is
63. The distinction between "proselytizing" and "non-proselytizing" is a tempting one in such
cases, though it tends to be filtered through the lens of the individual applying the term. Nonethe-
less, the Court has repeatedly rejected the suggestion that proselytizing speech should be afforded
less protection. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 125-27 (2001)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
64. See, e.g., Duran, 780 F. Supp. at 1052.
65. In Hazelwood, the Court stated that educators should have greater control over material
deemed to bear the "imprimatur" of the school so that students would learn the lesson the activity
was designed to teach, to protect readers and listeners from inappropriate material, and so that listen-
ers would not mistakenly attribute the views of the speaker to the school. See Hazelwood v. Kuhl-
meier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
66. Brady, supra note 59, at 1224-25. See, e.g., DeNooyer, 799 F. Supp. at 750.
67. Contra C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167, 174-75 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding elemen-
tary school teacher's refusal to permit first grade student to read in front of the class a story loosely
based on the Bible due to concerns about religious endorsement and impressionability).
68. In addition to concerns about the religious nature of the video, the second grade teacher in
DeNooyer argued that the show and tell presentations were designed to develop students' self esteem
and oral presentation skills, and that merely showing a video would defeat the purpose of the exer-
cise. See DeNooyer, 799 F. Supp. at 747. She also maintained that she wanted to prevent other stu-
dents from attempting to bring in videos, as the screening process would be too time consuming, and
showing videos would change the focus of the exercise. See id.
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not until more information is discovered through the process of give and
take between teacher and student that the teacher decides not to permit the
proposed religious speech. In Duran v. Nitsche,69 for example, a fifth grade
teacher gave a research assignment to her "Academically Talented Program"
class. 70 The teacher directed students to choose a topic by filling in the
blank at the end of the sentence, "The Power of _ ," and ultimately give
an oral report to the class based on their research over the course of several
weeks.7' Dana Duran chose the topic, "The Power of God," which was ini-
tially approved by her teacher. 72 As the semester continued, however, Duran
failed to turn in the entirety of her research materials to her teacher for re-
view, and the teacher was only aware of a survey Duran had collected from
peers regarding their belief in God, as well as six rhetorical questions Duran
prepared regarding the power of God.73 Though she initially permitted the
topic, Duran's teacher ultimately forbade her from giving her presentation in
front of the class, and instead listened to Duran's presentation in the library
outside the presence of other students.74 The teacher reasoned that she could
not be sure that what appeared to be an explicitly religious message would
be appropriate for her fifth grade class, and she worried that students would
attribute Duran's views to her.75
Duran's proposed speech never appeared to be outside the bounds of
any particular criteria for the assignment, yet the teacher ultimately decided
to restrict the speech on the ground of age-appropriateness. 76 It is difficult to
imagine a presentation on "The Power of God" that would not have been re-
ligious in nature, yet apparently somewhere along the way Duran's teacher
determined that what could have been an appropriate presentation ultimately
might turn out to be something very different. Duran did not provide her
teacher with a sufficient review of her research materials and work leading
up to the presentation so that her teacher could direct the presentation toward
a more appropriate format.77 On the facts accepted by the district court, it
seems that Duran's teacher's approach was sensitive to both Establishment
Clause and pedagogical values, and that perhaps her restriction was attribut-
able as much to Duran's lack of candor and preparedness as to the teacher's
fear of an overtly religious message.78
69. Duran, 780 F. Supp. at 1048.
70. Id. at 1049-50.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1050-51. The questions were: (1) "What kind of power does God have?"; (2) "How is
God's love power?"; (3) "What has God done with [H~is power?"; (4) "How powerful is God?"; (5)
"How can you see God's power through [Hlis work?"; (6) "What can God's power do?" Id. at 1051.
74. Id. at 1049-5 1.
75. Id. at 1055.
76. Id. at 1051.
77. Id. at 1050-51.
78. But see Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995) In Settle, a middle
school teacher gave a student a zero on a research paper entitled, "A Scientific and Historical Ap-
proach to the Life of Jesus Christ" on the grounds, inter alia, that a religious student could not ap-
proach the assignment objectively and that religion was not an appropriate subject for discussion in
public school. Id. at 153-55.
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As demonstrated by the facts of Duran, protecting speech while preserv-
ing Establishment Clause values can take considerable effort. Teachers, in
particular, may have to set clear guidelines, revise those guidelines accord-
ing to student progress, work with students toward an acceptable final prod-
uct, and in some cases even disclaim aspects of the student's work to disas-
sociate the school from the message.79 It is no wonder that teachers and
school officials often prefer a blanket prohibition on religious speech as the
easiest solution. Such a ban does little to protect student speech, and tends
to send a message that religious speech is somehow less favored than other
forms of student speech. In making blanket prohibitions, teachers tend to
overlook the fact that students desiring to incorporate religious themes into
classwork can be "captive speakers," in the same way that their peers are a
captive audience.80 This is not to say, however, that students who propose
religious speech should be permitted to flout the requirements of an assign-
ment. Teachers should enforce all curricular requirements with rigor and
demand that students learn the skill or activity the assignment is designed to
teach. Where necessary to protect other students, teachers may even fore-
close the speech altogether. But a blanket prohibition serves little pedagogi-
cal purpose, and precludes the opportunity for student and teacher to work
together in a process that rewards students for participating by permitting
them to engage in their chosen form of speech. The response that such an
approach is burdensome and time consuming for school officials tends to
overlook the reality that litigation in this area shows no signs of abating.
Thus, from a practical perspective, it is probably better to choose an ap-
proach that burdens teachers with teaching rather than one that has consis-
tently burdened them with defending lawsuits.
2. School Sponsored Speech Outside of the Classroom
8
'
In the context of school sponsored speech outside of the classroom, on
the other hand, it seems more likely that a court could find a violation of the
Establishment Clause. As stated above, courts often forego an Establish-
79. See Brady, supra note 59, at 1178-84.
80. See, e.g., Chad Allred, Guarding the Treasure: Protection of Student Religious Speech in the
Classroom, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 741 (1999).
Unlike the speakers in the traditional "captive audience" cases, in the classroom, the
speakers are also compelled to be there. Whereas the phone salesman, the pastor, and the
protester have thousands of people to whom they can express themselves, the student
speaker, compelled to be in school six to eight hours a day, does not have that option.
Id. at 758.
81. In this article I do not discuss Establishment Clause issues posed by student-initiated prayer
at events such as graduations and football games. Though lower courts have divided on the applica-
tion of the Court's doctrine, current Supreme Court precedent is fairly clear that many instances of
such speech violate the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S.
290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
ment Clause analysis and instead decide such cases on free speech grounds,
but the fact that an activity is sponsored by the school and held out to the
public can increase the possibility of perceived endorsement.
A case involving religious speech in a non-curricular school project
open to students and certain members of the public provides an example of a
school sponsored activity which raises Establishment Clause concerns. In
Fleming v. Jefferson County School District R-1, 82 the Tenth Circuit evalu-
ated a high school's prohibition of ceramic tiles with religious themes from
an art project displayed in the hallways and throughout the high school.
Columbine High School officials invited students, parents, and other mem-
bers of the community to paint tiles to be displayed in the school as a re-
sponse to the massacre that had occurred at the school months earlier.83 Stu-
dents and parents who painted tiles with religious messages challenged the
school's restriction on free speech grounds. 84 The court applied Hazelwood
and held that the tile project was a school sponsored activity over which the
school properly exercised control.85 Thus, the school needed only a valid
pedagogical reason for restricting speech, and the school's desire to avoid
making school property the site of religious controversy provided a suffi-
cient justification.8 6 Though the court in Fleming did not evaluate the possi-
bility of an Establishment Clause violation, one can make a credible argu-
ment that the tiles, a permanent part of the school, would have
communicated to the reasonable observer the school's intent to promote re-
ligion. Unless the school could have made clear that it did not promote the
religious message contained in the tiles, the Establishment Clause may have
provided an additional reason for the school to refuse the tiles.
Aside from the Establishment Clause, however, scholars have raised
other concerns about the propriety of religious speech in the public schools:
B. Religious Speech in the Public Square
In Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,87 the Court fa-
mously stated that a free speech clause doctrine excluding religious speech
would be "Hamlet without the prince. ',88 For some time the Court has been
committed to the protection of religious speech under the free speech
clause, 9 including proselytizing and even worship. 90 In terms of religion's
place in the hierarchy of speech, it is roughly equal to political speech and
other speech that is not considered to be of low value. This idea of equality
of religious speech with other speech means that it can be neither favored
82. 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002).
83. Id. at 920-21.
84. Id. at 922.
85. Id. at 923, 929-30.
86. Id. at 925, 931-32.
87. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
88. Id. at 760.
89. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
90. See id.
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nor disfavored under the free speech clause - it either is or is not entitled to
protection. Nonetheless, some have questioned whether a free speech para-
digm is the best way to protect religious practice that includes speech ele-
ments.9' To be sure, treating religious speech like nonreligious speech under
the Free Speech Clause is a move that is not likely to be eroded,92 but it is
important to consider the arguments of scholars who suggest that equality in
this context is misguided.
Many scholars who have joined the debate regarding the role of religion
in the public square argue that religion poses special dangers for democ-
racy.93 Thus even where the Establishment Clause would not prohibit reli-
gious speech, such speech should be curtailed to protect democratic institu-
tions and preserve the civil order.94 They argue that religion is inconsistent
with the essential aspects of democracy, because, unlike democracy, religion
"relies on unquestioning faith rather than logic, .... seeks to identify absolute
and everlasting truth rather than accommodate itself to the fluid, prelimi-
nary, and temporary reconciliation of fundamentally inconsistent values,....
[and] locates the primary source of authority over individual behavior out-
side" of human authority.95 The asserted result is an intense civil divisive-
ness that precludes the democratic resolution of conflicts.96 These argu-
ments have led to different but related proscriptions. Some critics of
religious speech in the public square maintain that religious adherents should
frame public argument in purely secular terms so that the arguments will be
accessible to all members of society.97 Others contend that religionists
should not even advance secular arguments unless those arguments represent
the real reasons for their advocacy. 98 Some appear to argue that these rea-
sons support expanding the scope of the Establishment Clause to include
more student speech.99
The general response to these arguments has been that a truly democ-
ratic system cannot simply exclude certain arguments as out of bounds.'00
91. See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech
Doctrine and Formal Neutrality, 18 J.L. & POL. 119 (2002).
92. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Freedom of Speech That Is Both Religious and Political, 29 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 793, 797 (1996) ("The Court has repeatedly rejected the claim that the Establishment
Clause somehow limits the constitutional protection of religious speech by private persons speaking
in their private capacity.").
93. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, When Is Religious Speech Not "Free Speech"?, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 379 (2000).
94. Id. at 451-59.
95. Id. at 382.
96. Id. at 451-59.
97. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988).
98. See, e.g., Robert Audi, The Place for Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic Society,
30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677 (1993).
99. See Gey, supra note 93, at 395.
100. Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim That Religious Arguments Should
Further, given religion's prominent place in the First Amendment, it is
somewhat untenable to suggest that religious speech, in particular, should be
singled out for exclusion. 101 In terms of divisiveness, disagreement regard-
ing secular convictions can be just as acrimonious as disagreement on reli-
gious matters.10 2 But a more important distinction exists in the case of reli-
gious speech in the public school context.
1. The Value of Defensive Speech in the Case of Religion
Claims about religious divisiveness and the democratic process tend to
fall flat when asserted in the context of religious speech in public schools.
While one can make the rather shaky case that religious speech in an oral
classroom assignment, for example, would tend to foment interminable con-
flict among students and prevent them from working together productively,
these are not the type of concerns that schools and students usually face.
Public school classrooms may be the incubators of democratic principles,
but students rarely attempt to promote religious messages for political rea-
sons) 0 3
Student speech concerns are better understood in the context of cases
like Barnette. °4 With Barnette in mind, it is easier to understand why reli-
gious speech in particular is entitled to First Amendment protection, and
why concerns short of an actual Establishment Clause violation should not
trump students' rights. The context of the elementary and secondary school
raises issues of self-development and identity, where platitudes about civil
strife, reason, and protecting democracy seem uniquely out of place. Stu-
dents are compelled by law to attend school, and thus in public school, the
alternative offered by the state, the danger of indoctrination is fairly high.
Student religious speech can protect students' developing religious identi-
ties, preserving an area that the state is not permitted to invade. The sev-
enth-grader passing out religious literature or turning in a report with a reli-
gious theme does not usually intend to persuade his peers to vote "no" on the
issue of school uniforms. A little later in life, however, when the same stu-
dent is old enough to participate in more consequential elections, we would
hope that he can vote based on interests and priorities that have developed
securely in the cocoon of the person, and not based on messages (implicitly
or explicitly) sent by school officials. 0 5
Be Excluded from Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 639 (1999); see also Laycock, su-
pra note 92, at 799 ("We simply do not have democratic self-government if we take seriously the
notion that there is something suspect about arguments that motivate two-thirds of the people and
that might appeal to ninety-five percent of them.").
101. See McConnell, supra note 100, at 645-46.
102. See id. at 648.
103. A recent case presents a notable exception. See Phillips v. Oxford Separate Mun. Sch. Dist.,
314 F. Supp. 2d 643 (N.D. Miss. 2003). In Phillips, a seventh grade student alleged a First Amend-
ment violation based on school officials' prohibition of an election poster containing a picture of the
Madonna and child and bearing the slogan: "He chose Mary... You should, too." Id. at 645.
104. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
105. Cf. Redish & Finnerty, supra note 29, at 65 ("It is naive to believe that the content of stu-
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2. Defensive Speech as a Safety Valve for Failed Establishment Clause
Claims
Defensive speech is no doubt useful in cases involving issues of politics
and race, but it can play a particularly important role in mitigating the im-
pact of quasi-religious activities that do not rise to the level of an Establish-
ment Clause violation. In cases involving public school activities that are
not clearly religious in nature, challenging students generally lose, even if
they are able to posit that the activities or curricula conflict with some of
their core religious beliefs. 10 6 As an alternative, students could respond to
the activity or curricula with speech about why the activity is offensive
rather than attempting to foreclose it altogether. For example, in the case
involving a student challenge to the rhetoric and ceremony surrounding a
high school's celebration of Earth Day," 7 a possible response may have
been for objecting students to attempt to obtain a segment of the official
program to air their own beliefs, 108 or perhaps to wear a tee shirt or human
poster with a conflicting message. An even more constructive response,
from a pedagogical perspective, would be to write a report about why Earth
Day activities assertedly promote religious belief. In this way the First
Amendment could protect students who wish to preserve their dissent from
the official message, even if the students cannot (and probably should not)
prevail in silencing the overall message.
In fact, defensive speech may be more important in cases where the of-
ficial theme or orthodoxy in question is not overtly religious. Adolescents
and children are more vulnerable to indoctrination than mature adults, but
even the young are likely to recognize overtly religious appeals, especially
dents' education will have little or no effect on the perspectives those students will bring to their
choices as citizens within the democratic framework."); Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizen-
ship: The Conflict Between Authority and Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L. J.
1647, 1648-49 (1986) (arguing that courts' failure to recognize students' individual rights may hin-
der public schools' ability to inculcate democratic values).
106. See, e.g., Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 77-79 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding
celebration of Earth Day at public high school did not endorse Gaia religion); Brown v. Woodland
Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d 1373, 1383 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting plaintiffs' challenge to "Im-
pressions" reading series alleging, inter alia, that certain activities approximated witchcraft).
107. See Altman, 245 F.3d at 58-59.
108. Cf., e.g., Hansen v. Ann Arbor Pub. Schs., 293 F. Supp. 2d 780, 800-03 (E.D. Mich. 2003)
(finding a First Amendment violation based on school's exclusion of particular viewpoint urged by
student from a Homosexuality and Religion panel presented during Diversity Week, and based on
school's censorship of student's assembly speech "What Diversity Means to Me" proposed as a re-
sponse to themes presented by the school during Diversity Week), discussed infra at notes 125-32.
Of course, the school in Hansen, by presenting a panel made up entirely of clergy who discussed the
proper interpretation of the Bible and other religious documents, necessarily violated the Establish-
ment Clause. See id. at 804-06. One can imagine, however, a similar challenge to a secular panel
asserting that the panel conflicts with certain religious doctrine and therefore violates the Establish-
ment Clause.
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when those messages are incongruent with the views to which they have
been exposed at home and elsewhere. On the other hand, students are
probably less likely to recognize subtle themes that do not have an obvious
religious connotation. Students are therefore more vulnerable to assimilat-
ing these seemingly neutral ideas. A vigorous First Amendment in this con-
text would support the efforts of students who successfully resist indoctrina-
tion, and signal to other students that the school's message is at least
somewhat controversial. Students could then discuss the issues with teach-
ers and administrators, or perhaps even better, raise questions at home.
I have argued elsewhere that the Establishment Clause should not be in-
terpreted to prevent mere exposure to offensive messages. °9 But to then
prevent students from asserting, in the same context, a non-disruptive con-
trary message surely subverts any reasonable anti-indoctrination or anti-
coercion principle. 10
3. "Offensive" Rather than "Defensive" Uses of Religious Speech
In this discussion it is important to recognize that not all student reli-
gious speech can be characterized as defensive. With defensive speech, stu-
dents attempt to express themselves in ways that preserve their developing
ideas from the fashioning hand of official orthodoxy. Much of students' re-
ligious speech, on the other hand, can easily be characterized as functionally
offensive."' Evangelical or proselytizing speech fits into this latter category
because such speech generally aims to win converts to a particular belief or
point of view. Offensive speech also tends to occur spontaneously rather
than in response to some official statement or orthodoxy about religious mat-
ters.
109. Roy, supra note 56, at 1. One proposed-approach to student religious speech appears to ap-
ply an exposure test. See Gey, supra note 93, at 437-43. Thus if students would be required to opt-
out of the presentation or activity to avoid exposure to a religious message, then the presentation
violates the Establishment Clause. See id. at 437-38.
110. Another safety valve is exit, but free exercise claims in cases in which school officials refuse
to accommodate objecting students have not been particularly successful. See, e.g., Mozert v. Haw-
kins, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (denying free exercise challenge to the "Holt" reading series on
the ground that the series contained themes antithetical to students' fundamentalist Christian beliefs).
Total exit is another possibility for students whose families have the financial means to send them to
private school. Nonetheless, it is important for students who wish to remain in public school to have
the ability to offer pertinent speech that incorporates their own religious values. Cf, e.g., Brady,
supra note 59, at 1191-1205. In a similar vein, Brady characterizes religious speech in classroom
assignments, for example, as "grey area" speech that serves a distinct function in mitigating values
conflicts:
If, for instance, the children in Mozert were permitted to bring their perspectives into
classroom activities and other instructional settings, they would be able to reaffirm and
defend their own values against the imposition of majoritarian norms by the school. Fur-
thermore, by sharing their views with others in school-sponsored settings, minority stu-
dents like the Mozerts can contribute alternative perspectives to the larger school com-
munity.
Id. at 1200.
I 11. See, e.g., Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d 98, 104-06
(D. Mass. 2003) (noting that students passed out candy canes with an evangelical message of salva-
tion).
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Religious speech that is functionally offensive admittedly does not fit
within the free speech framework discussed above, as the speech itself does
not appear to preserve student values or identity. Such speech could perhaps
be justified by free exercise values, particularly for student believers who
regard proselytizing and evangelism at school as religious duties. Nonethe-
less, offensive speech is not necessary to protect students from official or-
thodoxy, and some may argue that such speech creates the danger of coer-
cion and alienation of other students. 12 In the case of functionally offensive
speech that does not implicate the school in the message, such arguments
about harm to other students are probably misplaced. As suggested above,
proselytizing speech rarely serves as a proportional response to mild at-
tempts by school officials to prescribe orthodoxy. But proselytizing speech
may be an appropriate response to the types of messages that other students
often convey in public schools. Public school students swim in a sea of
competing messages, and most of the messages proselytize to one or another
dogma, activity, or association. Religious proselytizing adds yet one more
message for students to accept or reject, but ordinarily creates no special
danger that is more worrisome than say, students who proselytize others stu-
dents to lie, take drugs, defy authority, demean other students, or vandalize
property. It is true that such messages, unlike solicitations to religious clubs
or activities, never appear on fliers, banners or posters that would be toler-
ated by school officials. But students generally have and use other effective
means to convey such themes during school hours and on public school
property.
IV. APPLYING A NO-BIAS STANDARD IN SCHOOL SPEECH CASES
Having argued that the Court's free speech doctrine in the context of the
public schools incorporates an implicit no-bias standard, it is still left to de-
termine how to apply this principle in free speech cases. The application,
like the principle, is fairly simple, and does not require anything in the way
of new doctrine. In many cases, whether a court applies the no-bias standard
will depend upon the court's choice between Tinker or Hazelwood, but the
standard should aid courts in making that choice. In cases involving the al-
leged suppression of racial, religious or political speech, courts should rely
112. See, e.g., Gey, supra note 93, at 429-33; Susannah Barton Tobin, Note, Divining Hazelwood:
The Need for a Viewpoint Neutrality Requirement in School Speech Cases, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 217, 251 (2004), stating:
Admittedly, the Establishment Clause may not prohibit the expression of religious speech
by public school students in the same way it prohibits the endorsement of religious
speech by school officials. However, the provision of school space during school hours
to students proselytizing to other students about Christianity can be argued to be a kind of
school endorsement amounting to an unacceptable endorsement by the government.
Id.
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upon the viewpoint discrimination principles implicit in Tinker. Even if a
student's speech claim arises in the context of the classroom or curriculum,
there is little reason to afford Hazelwood deference if the student's speech
does not bear the "imprimatur" of the school. And in cases in which Hazel-
wood is appropriate, courts should nonetheless ensure that the reasons given
by school officials for restrictions on speech are not "sham" reasons conceal-
ing a desire to suppress a political, religious or racial viewpoint. 13 A sam-
pling of cases involving political, racial, and religious speech provide worth-
while vehicles to evaluate the no-bias principle.
In Barber ex rel. Barber v. Dearborn Public Schools,' 14 a high school
student wore a tee shirt with a picture of the President and the words "Inter-
national Terrorist" on the front in protest to the impending war with Iraq." 5
During lunch, school officials asked the student to remove the shirt or call
his father; the student refused to remove the tee shirt and shortly thereafter
left school for the day. 116 In granting the student's request for a preliminary
injunction on the free speech issue, the court held that school officials had
not shown a likelihood of material and substantial disruption, notwithstand-
ing that a significant number of the student population were likely to be of
Iraqi descent, and school officials opined that Iraqi students might react
strongly to the tee shirt's implicit message.' '1 Treating the case as a modem
day Tinker, the court reasoned that school officials' fear of an unpleasant re-
sponse did not justify the limitation on student speech."" The outcome in
Barber seems appropriate, but not simply because the tee shirt, like the arm-
bands in Tinker, amounts to "pure speech." Barber's message, though po-
tentially quite offensive, expressed a political view with which the school
could not interfere without good reason. In Barber's case, good reason
meant more than just the potential for a negative reaction." 9
A similar case with a different result is Baxter v. Vigo County School
Corp., 120 in which an elementary school student attempted to protest alleged
racism and unfairness by wearing tee shirts that stated, "Unfair Grades,"
"Racism," and "I Hate Lost Creek."' 2' In granting the school official's re-
quest for qualified immunity, the court reasoned that the rule in Tinker did
not apply at the elementary school level, and that the continuing validity of
113. Cf, e.g., Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1292-93 (10th Cir. 2004) (reversing sum-
mary judgment for defendant university in a compelled speech case based upon the university's re-
quirement that drama students use offensive language during mandatory exercises). "Although we
do not second-guess the pedagogical wisdom or efficacy of an educator's goal, we would be abdicat-
ing our judicial duty if we failed to investigate whether the educational goal or pedagogical concern
Was pretextual." Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985)).
114. 286 F. Supp. 2d 847 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
115. Id. at 849.
116. See id. at 850.
117. Id. at 856-57.
118. Id. at 857-58.
119. Id. at 857.
120. 26 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 1994).
121. Id. at 730.
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the rule itself was doubtful in light of Bethel and Hazelwood.122 In focusing
on the student's age, the court completely discounted the school's potential
motivation in suppressing the student's protest. 23 The subject matter of the
student's protest, even an elementary school student's protest, should have
alerted the court to analyze the school's proffered reasons for limiting the
message. On the facts in the opinion, the school made no showing of poten-
tial disruption or interference with the operation of the school.1 24 Nor did
school officials argue that there were general rules forbidding tee shirts with
messages. The nature of the student's shirt, an apparent protest based on the
student's (and more likely, the parents') perception of unfair treatment based
on race, deserved the First Amendment protection afforded by the Tinker
standard.
Finally, Hansen v. Ann Arbor Public Schools125 illustrates that courts
can apply a no-bias principle even under a Hazelwood analysis. In Hansen,
the district court found a violation of free speech based upon the school's
exclusion of a student's particular viewpoint from a "Homosexuality and
Religion" panel, and by the school's censorship of the student's proposed
speech at an assembly.126 As a part of "Diversity Week," the high school
permitted students and student organizations to develop and present panels
on topics related to race, religion, and sexual orientation.1 27 The plaintiff in
Hansen, a member of a Christian club, informed school officials that she de-
sired to submit proposed speakers to appear on the "Homosexuality and Re-
ligion" panel to advance a message of religious disapproval of homosexual-
ity. 28 After some vacillation, school officials decided to proceed with the
panel without permitting Hansen's proposed view. 129 Later that week, when
Hansen proposed to explain in a speech at an assembly her reaction to some
of the views expressed during Diversity Week, school officials directed
Hansen to change her speech to eliminate content officials deemed inappro-
priate and offensive.13° In evaluating the propriety of the school's actions in
122. Id. at 737-38.
123. See generally id. at 728.
124. See generally id.
125. 293 F. Supp. 2d 780 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
126. Id. at 782-83.
127. Id. at 784.
128. Id. at 784-88.
129. Id. at 790. At one point school officials cited a procedural reason for refusing Hansen's re-
quest, claiming that she failed to attend a mandatory meeting that was a prerequisite for participa-
tion. Id. School officials testified, however, that they believed that Hansen's proposed viewpoint
would interfere with and/or dilute the impact of the panel's message about homosexuality. See id.
130. Id. at 791. The controversial portion of Hansen's proposed speech outlined her views on
religion and homosexuality:
One thing I don't like about Diversity Week is the way that racial diversity, religious di-
versity, and sexual diversity are lumped together and compared as if they are the same
things. Race is not strictly an idea. It is something you are born with; something that
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light of the First Amendment, the district court, applying a viewpoint dis-
crimination standard under Hazelwood, observed that school officials were
motivated by their apparent disagreement with Hansen's message, notwith-
standing that school officials had offered several pedagogical reasons for
their actions.13' The viewpoint discrimination was not the sort that would
merely limit the views available in the marketplace; rather, the court opined
that the school's asserted reasons for limiting speech were not pedagogical,
but "political, cultural or religious, or all three."'' 32  Hansen exemplifies
many of the dangers associated with indoctrination, and provides a prime
example of the type of case in which the no-bias principle should be applied.
V. CONCLUSION
In evaluating the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the area of public
elementary and secondary schools, scholars have wrestled with whether
Tinker or Hazelwood provides the appropriate standard. Some have offered
pragmatic reasons for the apparent shift in the Court's doctrine from the
speech protective standard in Tinker to the deferential approach of Hazel-
wood.13 3 Hazelwood does represent a shift from libertarian to authoritarian
concerns, but it does not leave behind the essence of Tinker. Hazelwood ap-
parently rejects the marketplace of ideas, at least in the context of school
sponsored activities, but there is more to support Tinker than the metaphor of
the marketplace. Tinker's concerns about indoctrination in the public
schools can be expressed as a no-bias principle that is important in the in-
stances of student political, religious, and racial speech. Students' attempts
at expression in these areas can be a particularly important means of devel-
oping and preserving identity. Particularly in the case of religion, a type of
defensive speech can be an effective response to perceived attempts by the
school to enforce orthodoxy. A no-bias concept, whether applied under
Tinker or Hazelwood, reflects the principle that school officials should not
attempt to interfere with a student's overall development in critical areas that
should be left to parents, religious or cultural communities, and other institu-
tions that are not a part of the state.
doesn't change throughout your life.... On the other hand, your religion is your choice.
Sexuality implies an action, and there are people who have been straight, then gay, then
straight again. I completely and whole-heartedly support racial diversity, but I can't ac-
cept religious and sexual ideas or actions that are wrong.
Id. at 791-92.
131. Id. at 800-802. School officials stated such reasons as "teaching students to stay on topic,
making students aware of minority points of view, [and] creating a safe and supportive environment
for gay and lesbian students." Id. at 800.
132. Id. at 802.
133. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 34, at 527-28 (noting that Tinker was a product of the
Warren Court and Hazelwood a product of the more conservative Burger Court); see also Rosemary
C. Salomone, Common Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening to the Voices of Dissent, 14 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 169, 193 (1996).
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